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This article considers the new corporate insolvency legislation that came into force in China 
in June 2007.  This law is part of a remarkable transformation in the Chinese economy in 
recent years.  Significant numbers of ailing state owned enterprises have been reformed 
and subjected to hard budgetary constraints, while the private sector has grown 
dramatically.  Market forces play a greater role, whereas the economy was previously 
tightly controlled by the state.  These changes, together with pressures arising from 
external bodies such as the European Union, led to an urgent need for the adoption of the 
revised insolvency law, which has at its heart corporate rescue procedures.  This article 
considers the content of this new law, the background to it, and also assesses the prospects 
for its operation.  In particular attention is paid to the level of scope for state interference 
in the operation of the law. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
For almost thirty years China has been on a long road of reform, casting off features 
of its planned economy in the development of a market economy.  This reform 
process has escalated in recent years, with the requirements associated with 
accession to the WTO, and a number of key developments have taken place, 
including a reduction in state interference in the market; reforms to corporate 
governance;1 and the liberalisation of the banking regime.2  One particularly notable 
aspect of state interference related to the treatment of uneconomic state owned 
enterprises which had emerged under the planned economy and could not be easily 
liquidated on account of their key social role. Although insolvency laws were 
available,3 their use could be blocked by the state and there was an exemption that 
could be applied to many SOEs (State Owned Enterprises).4  The preference was 
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 S Tenev, C Zhang and L Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building 
the Institutions of Modern Markets (Washington DC, World Bank and International Finance 
Corporation, 2002). 
2 For a recent review see S Thomas and C Ji, “Banking on Reform” (2006) 33 (3) China 
Business Review 20.  On earlier reforms see YK Mo, “A review of recent banking reforms in China” 
in Bank for International Settlements Policy Papers No. 7 - Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues 
and Experience, 90. 
3 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (for Trial Implementation) 1986, hereafter the “1986 Law”. 
4 1986 Law, Articles 3 and 8. 
for planned bankruptcies under the control of the government.  The beginning of 
the end of this particular phase of state interference has recently been marked with 
the introduction of a revised system of insolvency laws, which took effect on June 
1st 2007.5  The new law prima facie marks a transition to court-centred, market 
driven, bankruptcies free from state control.  Potentially this reform could have a 
huge impact in contributing to the development of the socialist market economy, 
through enabling liquidations that would not have taken place previously and, more 
positively, through the implementation of formal corporate rescue procedures.  
However the full potential of the new law is unlikely to be reached in the short 
term.  If the law operates entirely according to market forces it could potentially 
have a devastating social impact in view of the role played by SOEs in providing 
financial benefits to employees and the lack of an adequate social welfare system to 
fulfil this role in the absence of the SOEs.6  For this reason a level of state 
interference is likely to persist and the manner in which the new law is drafted and is 
to be operated should facilitate this to a limited extent.  
 
                                            
5 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China, hereafter the “2006 Law”.  
An unofficial English language translation of the new law is available at 
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/company/the-enterprise-
bankruptcy-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html accessed 29 January 2008.  
6 J Leung, “Social security reforms in China: issues and prospects” (2003) 12 International Journal of 
Social Welfare 73. 
This article will outline the new law with a particular focus on the corporate rescue 
provisions.  Corporate rescue has dominated global insolvency law reforms this 
decade and it lies at the heart of the new Chinese law.  Parts A outlines the context 
of the introduction of the new law by explaining the problems presented by 
uneconomic SOEs and also the manner in which they have been tackled.   Part B 
addresses the need for corporate rescue laws to cater for private enterprises.  Part 
C considers the forces that led to the introduction of the new law.  Key features of 
the new law will be outlined in Part D, with a particular emphasis on the possible 
scope for state control.  Finally some remaining barriers to the operation of the 
new law will be examined in Part E. 
 
B. THE PROBLEMS OF UNECONOMIC SOES 
The planned economy was dominated by SOEs, which produced four fifths of the 
output from the manufacturing sector and employed two thirds of all industrial 
employees.7   The planned economy was not however conducive to efficient and 
economic SOEs,8 which were merely required to meet planned production targets.  
                                            
7 NR Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington DC, Brookings, 1998), 25. 
8 Z Wei, O Varela and M Kabir Hassan, “Ownership and Performance in Chinese 
Manufacturing Industry” (2002) 12 Journal of Multinational Financial Management 61 note lower 
productivity in SOEs.  On the benefits of private ownership in terms of efficiency see O Hart, A 
Shleifer and RW Vishny, “The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons” 
There was no requirement for SOEs to turn a profit and, shielded from the 
pressures of competition there was no impetus for them to do so. 9  Moreover, in 
the absence of a social welfare system, SOEs were of great social significance in 
providing benefits to employees, retired workers and their families.  In post reform 
China the workforce was dependent on SOEs for benefits such as wages, social 
security and health care: the so called “iron rice bowl” (Tie Fan Wan).10  Financial 
support from the state was not direct but rather was filtered through the enterprise.   
Not only did SOEs provide welfare benefits for their employees but they were also 
widely reported to be overstaffed.   
 
The extent of the social obligations placed on SOEs and their lack of budgetary 
constraints meant that they lacked a commercial basis and made it difficult for them 
to achieve profitability.  This in turn led to pressures on the state banks.  To keep 
uneconomic SOEs going, state banks were commonly directed by the state to 
advance loans to SOEs.  Such loans were based on compulsion, rather than 
                                                                                                                             
(1997) 112 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1127; and A Shleifer, “State Versus Private Ownership” 
(1988) 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 133. 
9 On the problems presented by SOEs see CA Holz, China’s Industrial State-Owned Enterprises: 
Between Profitability and Bankruptcy (Singapore, World Scientific, 2003). 
10 S Cook, “From Rice Bowl to Safety Net: Insecurity and Protection during China’s Transition” 
(2002) 20 Development Policy Review 615. 
commercial principles11 and the potential for enforcement was limited.  Loans to 
SOEs are reported to have constituted a significant proportion of lending by the 
state banks.  Relatively recent estimates suggest that around 40% of such loans are 
non performing,12 amounting to around US$600 billion.13  In consequence it was 
difficult for the state owned banks to operate on a commercial basis.   
 
The problem of uneconomic SOEs was in part addressed with the enactment of the 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (for Trial Implementation),14 which was introduced in 
                                            
11 NR Lardy, supra, n 7, 83. 
12 M Wolf, “Why is China Growing So Slowly?” (2005) 146 Foreign Policy 50, 51.  A more 
modest rate is indicated by statistics provided by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, showing 
that state banks hold about RMB 1251,78 billion in non-performing loans, which account for 6.17 per 
cent of the total commercial loans: see http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/index.jsp accessed 
on January 29 2008. 
13 M Barker and R Purser, “Moving China’s Goalposts” (2005) 2 International Corporate Rescue 
328, 329. 
14 Adopted at the 18th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s 
Congress and Promulgated by Order No. 45 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, 
December 2 1986.  English translation at www.novexcn.com/enterprise_bankruptcy.html accessed 
on 29 January 2008 and DG Boshkoff and Y Song, “China’s New Bankruptcy Law: A Translation and 
Brief Introduction” (1987) 61 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 359.  See Ta-Kuang Chang, “The 
Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the Chinese Legislative Process” (1987) 28 
198615 for implementation in relation to SOEs16 so that inefficient and outdated 
enterprises could be weeded out.17  This law may be characterised as lacking in 
detail, subject to excessive restrictions and to too much state intervention in 
proceedings.   It contains both liquidation and corporate rescue procedures.18  In 
                                                                                                                             
Harvard International Law Journal 333 on the background to this law and Z Xiao, “China’s Bankruptcy 
Law: Socialist in Characteristic, Capitalist in Methods” (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 58. 
15 This was not the first occurrence of bankruptcy laws in China.  Such laws had been 
introduced in 1906 but had been abolished in 1949 with the founding of the PRC.  See further S Li, 
“Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years” (Winter 2001) V Harvard Asia 
Quarterly http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/95/40/ accessed 29 January 2008; and L Cocks, 
“Chinese Insolvency Law: a Précis of Recent Changes” (2005) 2 International Corporate Insolvency 184, 
185. 
16 1986 Law, Article 2. 
17 Ta-Kuang Chang, “The Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the Chinese 
Legislative Process” (1987) 28 Harvard International Law Journal 333, 336, reporting the conclusion of a 
study by the Technology and Economics Research Centre of the State Council. 
18 An enterprise is regarded as bankrupt if it is unable to pay its debts when due on account of 
serious losses due to mismanagement: 1986 Law, Art. 3.  The requirement of mismanagement is an 
unusual restriction that cuts down the scope of applicability, since firms that have lost money due to 
seasonal factors, for example, may be just as deserving of assistance.  Moreover the decision as to 
whether mismanagement has occurred may lead to unnecessary delay.  The mismanagement element 
is notably absent from the Shenzhen bankruptcy law: Art. 3, discussed in X Zhang and CD Booth, 
“Chinese Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging Market Economy: The Shenzhen Experience” (2001) 15 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1, 7. 
spite of its long history there have been comparatively few bankruptcy proceedings 
brought under the 1986 law,19 for example only 32 cases in 1990, and although this 
statistic rose exponentially, ”from 277 in 1989-93 to 2,100 in 1994-95 and further to 
5,640 in 1996-97”, 20 this represented only an estimated 1.5% of SOEs.21  This lack 
of usage was not due to a shortage of suitable cases for treatment but rather the 
social catastrophe that widespread bankruptcies would create.   
 
Legal restrictions enabled tight control to be exerted by the state on the number of 
bankruptcies.  A SOE could only file for bankruptcy with the permission of the 
government authority in charge.22  SOEs also could be shielded from bankruptcy 
proceedings under Article 3 of the Bankruptcy Law if they carried on business as a 
public utility enterprise, or an enterprise with an important relationship to the 
national economy and the people's livelihood, such as a petrol company, and for 
which the relevant government departments granted subsidies or adopted other 
measures to assist the repayment of debts.  This provision enabled bankruptcy 
proceedings to be avoided in cases where a government authority provided finance.  
                                            
19 Li, supra n 15, citing statistics from the Supreme Court Annual Work Report. 
20 World Bank "Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: a Case and Agenda for Reforming the 
Insolvency System" (2001) http://www.worldbank.org.cn/English/Content/485a6232469.shtml 
accessed 29 January 2008. 
21 Ibid.  NR Lardy noted an estimated bankruptcy rate of only 0.06% in 1996: supra n 7, 273. 
22 1986 Law, Article 8. 
Where bankruptcies took place they were carefully planned (based on the 
documents issued by the State Council respectively in 1994, 1997 and 2000).23  In 
cases where the law was to be implemented the approval of the National Bankruptcy 
Liaison and Group, which is organised by the State Council, was required.24   
 
The manner in which the 1986 law was drafted also enabled the state to exert 
control over the opening of reorganisation proceedings, since only the government 
authority was able to apply for reorganisation.25  Therefore, the reorganisation 
                                            
23 Planned bankruptcy or administrative closure was created and implemented concomitant 
with the Capital Structure Optimisation Programme (CSOP) in 1994, in which the State Council 
issued a document, entitled “Pronouncement Concerning the Trial Implementation of the Bankruptcy 
Law for SOEs in Certain Cities”, that guided the bankruptcy of SOEs of 18 “test point” cities 
excluding the 1986 law. The scope of this project was enlarged to 56 cities in 1996 and 111 cities in 
1997. In 1999 the scope was expanded to national level. This meant that as long as the merger and 
bankruptcy of one SOE was listed in the national programme of the central government, it should 
first follow the rules established by the State Council. For details see Alan CW Tang, Insolvency in 
China and Hong Kong: A Practitioner’s Perspective (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2005), paras.5.80-5.81; Y Sun, 
Bankruptcy Law: Legal Theory and Practical Analysis (Beijing, People’s Court Press, 2003), 18-22 (in 
Chinese). 
24 Jingxia Shi, “Twelve Years to Sharpen One Sword: The 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and 
China’s Transition to a Market Economy” (2007) 16 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 645, 
652. 
25 1986 Law Article 17. 
proceedings could not be invoked without the approval of the government.26  Not 
only was it extremely limiting that the debtor was not entitled to petition for rescue; 
but also the creditor’s attempt to salvage the financially struggling enterprise could 
be blocked by government intervention.  The commencement of proceedings was 
therefore out of the hands of creditors.  In consequence the reorganisation process 
was strongly politicised and it undoubtedly hampered the functioning of the rescue 
procedure, resulting in very low, possibly non existent, use of the procedure.27  
Corporate rescue proceedings commonly will entail a reorganisation of the business 
which will be accompanied by a reduction in the workforce.  The greater the 
proportion of employees who are retained the more costly the rescue efforts 
potentially become.  In China the social welfare system was inadequate to meet 
what was a significant unemployment problem and this led to state interference in 
insolvency proceedings.  For example it has been reported that, since local 
governments are responsible for the resettlement of redundant employees, these 
governments will not approve bankruptcy proceedings unless there was provision 
                                            
26 See DC Clarke, “Regulation and its Discontents: Understanding Economic Law in China” 
(1992) 2 Stanford Journal of International Law 283, 299-300. 
27 See W Wang, “Adopting Corporate Rescue Regimes in China: A Comparative Survey”, 
(1998) 9 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 234, section 3.1; and also the comments on the website 
<www.asianrestructuring.com>. 
for such resettlement,28 although this requirement was understandable in light of the 
destitution that redundant employees might otherwise face,29 in particular in cases 
where social security provision is inadequate or unavailable.30 
 
Rather than liquidating struggling SOEs, efforts in many cities were directed at 
restoring SOEs to financial health by a process of mergers and restructuring through 
a hiving off of unproductive units.31  These mergers were the preferred means of 
dealing with struggling SOEs, rather than bankruptcy proceedings.32  In such cases 
autonomous legislation was applicable, but was not permitted to contradict the rules 
and principles which were established by national law.  There was also a place for 
informal arrangements and debt restructuring, 33 as in Changchun style debt 
                                            
28 X Lan, “Outdated Bankruptcy Law Updated” http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200430/Business-
200430(B).htm accessed 27 October 2006. 
29 F Chen, “Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labour Protests in China” (2000) 
44 The China Journal 41, 45-50, describing the destitution faced by redundant employees and 
consequent examples of unrest. 
30 Y Zhu, “Recent Developments in China's Social Security Reforms” (2002) 55 International 
Social Security Review 39, 46, noting that unemployment benefit was concentrated in certain cities. 
31 Li, supra n 15. 
32 L Burton, “An Overview of Insolvency Proceedings in Asia” (2000) 6 Annual Survey of 
International & Comparative Law 113, 119. 
33 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is not the only relevant law.  It was supplemented by 
chapter 19 of Civil Procedure Law 1991, containing insolvency laws applicable to non SOEs, by 
restructuring – a market-oriented approach sponsored by government and debt 
restructuring by asset management companies (AMCs).34  Merger activity is one of 
the key means of maximising the potential of businesses, since it can entail a 
rationalisation of resources and an overhaul of a board of directors who may be 
underperforming.  Indeed it has been argued that the threat of a takeover is one of 
the key incentives for directors to maximise their performance,35 however such 
benefits only arise as a result of properly functioning market forces.  Commonly in 
China the government would attempt to force a profitable and well running 
enterprise to merge with a loss making one, regardless of the economic 
considerations.36   
 
                                                                                                                             
guidance released by the Supreme Court in 1991, which was revised in 2002 and also by documents 
issued by the state council setting out policies applicable in selected cities.  Other local schemes 
were developed in Special Economic Zones, such as in Shenzhen.  See Zhang and Booth, supra n 18.  
For a detailed list of applicable laws see R Tomasic and M Wang, “The Long March Towards China’s 
New Bankruptcy Law”, in R Tomasic (ed), Insolvency Law in East Asia (Ashgate, 2006), 95-98. 
34 See comments of CD Booth in “Corporate/Debt Restructuring: Japan, the Hong Kong SAR 
& the People's Republic of China - A Roundtable Discussion” (2002) 10 American Bankruptcy Institute 
Law Review 1, 23. 
35 See e.g. C Bradley, “Corporate Control: Markets and Rules” (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 
170. 
36 The merger of Shanxi Yuncheng Detergent Factory in 1994 is a typical example. The details of the 
case are available at: Alan CW Tang, supra n 23, para.5.88-5.91. 
A gradual and tightly controlled approach was taken to the reduction of the 
workforces.  Such a process began in 1987 with a provision youhua zuhe that 
enabled excess workers to be laid off.  The approach favoured re-employment of 
such workers, rather than monetary provision by the state.  Workers were 
commonly “internally absorbed” by reemployment by a subsidiary of the SOE 
established for example to run a business such as a restaurant or shop.37  Other 
redundancies on a significant scale followed in 1992 but enterprises were required to 
provide employees with continued income, although often at an inadequate level and 
without medical insurance.38  More sustainable means of re-employment of workers 
were developed.39  New employers were encouraged to take on redundant 
employees by means of tax benefits and redundant employees were given assistance 
in setting up their own businesses.  In addition, restrictions which limited 
employees to particular geographical areas were gradually removed.   
 
This process has had many positive effects: over 3,370 debt-laden SOEs went 
bankrupt through planned bankruptcy, and 223.8 billion yuan of non-performing 
                                            
37 Chen, supra n 29, 46; and generally L Wong and K Ngok, “Social Policy between Plan and 
Market: Xiagang (Off Duty Employment) and the Policy of the Re-employment Service Centres in 
China” (2006) 40 Social Policy and Administration 158. 
38 Ibid at 46-7. 
39 Wong and Ngok, supra n 37, 168-9. 
loans were dealt with.40  Although 6.2 million workers were made redundant the 
government made significant efforts to find alternative employment for them.  
However it also led to undue government intervention and unfair competition 
between the SOEs and privately owned enterprises and foreign owned enterprises.  
In light of the impact of the closure of SOEs on the workforce, special policies were 
applicable, giving preference to the employees’ claims, which were ranked prior to 
secured claims.  In addition, some SOEs used this opportunity to escape their 
debts, especially major debts owed to banks.  
 
In addition to the planned closure of failing SOEs, efforts have been directed at 
introducing market based principles to viable SOEs.  Accordingly hard budgetary 
constraints have increasingly been imposed upon SOEs in recent years.41  SOEs 
underwent a process of corporatisation and either the state became the sole 
shareholder or outside investors were permitted under the control of the state.42  
This corporatisation was undertaken in the hope that it would lead to greater 
monitoring by investors and promote higher standards among managers.  Managers 
                                            
40 Y Xu, The Speech on Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Beijing, Law Press-China, 2006), 408 (in 
Chinese). 
41 NR Lardy, supra n 7,141; CA Holz, supra n 9, 308-9. 
42 L Miles and Z Zhang, “Improving Corporate Governance in State-Owned Corporations in 
China: Which Way Forward” (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 213, 216. 
were given greater autonomy in the allocation of resources and outputs.  
Diversified ownership was promoted through private enterprises, and foreign joint 
ventures.  Corporatisation efforts intensified from 1997, as set out in proposals of 
the Fifteenth National Congress of the Communist Party and particularly the Fourth 
Plenum in 1999.  The level of state ownership was reduced except in relation to 
industries related to national security; natural monopolies; industries providing 
important public goods and services; and pillar industries and backbone enterprises 
in high and new technology industries.  At that time also the part to be played in 
the economy by non-SOEs was more expressly recognised, as the status of SOEs 
was downgraded from a “principal component” of the economy to merely a “pillar 
of the economy” and the part of privately owned enterprises was upgraded from a 
“supplementary component” of the economy to an “important component” of the 
economy.  However the adoption of a change in managerial culture, after 40 years 
of state control, has been slow to take root.43  Although in one survey profits 
among 169 SOEs were found to have risen,44 this increase was largely accountable to 
                                            
43 E M Freund, "Fizz, Froth, Flat: The Challenge of Converting China's SOEs into Shareholding 
Corporations" (2001) 18 Policy Studies Review 96. 
44 One analyst even went so far as to conclude that China’s SOEs are no more loss making 
than US listed companies and that the proportion of uneconomic SOEs is now down to 32.4% 
(11,112 out of 34,280): Jonathan Anderson of investment bank UBS, quoted in 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4534048.stm page last updated 9 January 2006.  These findings 
only 12 companies, notably utility companies holding monopolies.   Moreover it has 
been notoriously difficult to assess the worth of SOEs, due to inadequate acco
procedures
unting 
ill 
                                                                                                                            
45 and unclear property ownership rights.  There is therefore st
considerable progress to be made.  
 
 
C. THE RISE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 
Accompanying the corporatisation of SOEs has been an increased role for privately 
controlled enterprises.  The productivity of Chinese private enterprises has 
expanded significantly over time, with such enterprises having been found in a survey 
by the OECD in 2005 to account for well over half of GDP (59.2%), increased from 
barely a half of GDP (50.4%) in the late 1990s. 46  Notably the financing of this 
expansion of the private sector would appear to have come primarily from informal 
 
must however be treated with a note of caution, in view of the dangers that the financial information 
presented by the enterprises may be distorted. 
45 The Auditor General reported in 2001 that 68% of the accounts of 1290 of China’s biggest 
companies were inaccurate: M O’Neill, “China Auditor in Shock Report”, South China Morning Post, 8 
January 2001. 
46 OECD Economic Surveys, 2005, No.13 - China.  See also F Allen, J Qian and M Qian, “Law, 
Finance, and Economic Growth in China” (2005) 77 Journal of Financial Economics 57, 78. 
sources, which may have a destabilising effect.47  This reliance on informal sources 
arose because of significant reluctance to lend to private sector enterprises, in 
particular on an unsecured basis, on account of factors such as ambiguity in their 
legal status,48 however formal lending to the private sector has risen49 and is likely to
rise further in the face of reforms to the banking sector, notably the influx of fore
lenders.   
 
ign 
                                           
 
In spite of this importance of private sector firms to the economy there was 
hitherto no provision for them to benefit from corporate rescue proceedings.  
When the 1986 law was drafted the economy was dominated by SOEs, with few non 
SOEs.  Therefore no provision was made in the Law for its application to non 
SOEs.  The Civil Litigation Law of 9 April 1991, Chapter 1950 was enacted to 
include bankruptcy provisions applicable to other enterprises with the status of legal 
persons, including privately owned enterprises.  However the content of this law is 
 
47 Further discussed in K Tsai, Back Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China (Cornell 
University Press, 2002).  The relatively low level of lending to private enterprises is also noted in 
Allen et al, ibid, 70. 
48 K Tsai, "Beyond Banks: The Local Logic of Informal Finance and Private Sector Development 
in China," presented at a conference on Financial Sector Reform in China, Harvard Business School, 
and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, September 11-13, 2001.  
49 Allen et al, supra n 46, 77. 
50 Procedures for Insolvency and Debt Repayment of Corporate Enterprises. 
much more limited than that applicable to SOEs, in particular in that it omits 
corporate rescue procedures.  There was some debate about whether the 
corporate rescue provisions in the 1986 law were capable of implementation in 
relation to non SOEs, with a statement to this effect by the Supreme Court,51 
however the details of this application were not fleshed out and the held view was 
that this statement could not prevail over what was set out in the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law.  The absence of a reorganisation procedure in this law has proved 
to be damaging, necessitating such proceedings taking place on an unregulated basis.  
There are precedents for corporate rescue proceedings in the shadow of the law in 
the London Approach, under which major creditors are encouraged to cooperate to 
avoid placing undue and premature pressure on a debtor prior to the 
implementation of a plan of reorganisation or composition,52 and which has 
                                            
51 1992 Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application 
of the Civil Procedure Law. 
52 See J Flood, R Abbey, E Skordaki and P Aber, The Professional Restructuring of Corporate 
Rescue: Company Voluntary Arrangements and the London Approach (London, ACCA, 1995); A Belcher, 
Corporate Rescue (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1997), 117–122; V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: 
Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 219–229; JH Armour and S Deakin, 
“Norms in Private Insolvency: the ’London Approach’ to the Resolution of Financial Distress” (2001) 
1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 21. 
influenced informal corporate rescue mechanisms in other countries.53  However 
informal proceedings in China foundered in the face of an insufficient legal 
infrastructure.   
 
D. IMPETUS FOR REFORMS 
This changing economic climate has created a pressing need for corporate rescue 
laws, so that SOEs that are flagging in the face of their budgetary constraints can be 
aided and privately controlled enterprises can be assisted in the event of any 
economic downturn caused, for example, by a collapse in the real estate market.54  
Although the 1986 law was originally introduced “for Trial Implementation” it has 
been durable, primarily due to the protracted nature of the reform process,55 rather 
than the long term suitability of the 1986 law.  Efforts to introduce a revised law 
began in 1994 but were hitherto stymied.  The pivotal social role of SOEs 
                                            
53  For example in Hong Kong, see B Ye and X Sa, “Hong Kong Corporate Rescue: 
Developments and Debate from a PRC Mainland Judge’s Viewpoint”, in K Gromek Broc and R Parry 
(eds), Corporate Rescue (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands, Kluwer, 2006), Ch. 9.  For a more general 
review see GE Meyerman, “The London Approach and Corporate Debt Restructuring in East Asia”, 
in C Adams, RE Litan and M Pomerleano, Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia 
(Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 299-322. 
54 Brian Bremner, "Banking on China's Reforms" Business Week, February 6 2006. 
55 See Shi, supra n 24, 645, 654. 
contributed not only to their financial difficulties but it also delayed the process of 
reform to the insolvency laws.  It was felt that a process of rapid reform would 
generate high social costs in the form of unemployment and the growth of a social 
divide in wealth, leading to instability and rioting.56  For these reason the process of 
reform could only be gradual. 57   
  
A modernised bankruptcy law which particularly emphasized corporate rescue was 
submitted to the Standing Committee of National Peoples Congress (NPC) in 1995, 
but was rejected because of fears about its potential social impact. After that, there 
were several occasions on which the bankruptcy law programme was included in the 
legislative schedule but was suspended.  There were both internal and external 
pressures towards the introduction of the new law.  Internally there was lobbying 
by banks.  Externally, there were significant political pressures.  Notably the denial 
                                            
56 Wong and Ngok, supra n 37, 158-9.  In August 2005, Zhou Yongkang, Minister of Public 
Security, announced that 3.7 million citizens had participated in over 74,000 mass incidents in 2004. 
Disturbances are reported to have increased to 87,000 in 2005: Richard McGregor, “Data show 
social unrest on the rise in China” FT.com, January 19, 2006, but to have fallen in 2006: Richard 
McGregor, “Beijing reports decline in protests” FT.com, November 8, 2006. 
57 In contrast, in Eastern European countries such as Hungary the painful process of dismantling 
SOEs that were no longer economically viable took place in the early 1990s at a relatively rapid pace.  
See PG Hare, “From Central Planning to Market Economy: Some Microeconomic Issues” (1990) 100 
The Economic Journal 581, 583-4 on earlier reforms. 
by the EU of recognition of China as having a market economy status was 
attributable in part to its absence of bankruptcy proceedings.58  The absence of 
effective bankruptcy laws has been regarded as contributing to the dumping by 
Chinese manufacturers of goods at below cost price, and it is a factor that is 
examined by anti dumping regulators in assessing whether a firm operates in a 
market economy.59  A lack of market economy status leads to higher anti dumping 
levies, which may in turn prevent access to markets, deter foreign investment and 
inhibit the development of industries.   
 
In light of these pressures, the new bankruptcy and reorganisation law, which 
embodied significant efforts of draftsmen, went through a final reading on the 23rd 
meeting of the 10th session of Standing Committee of NPC in August 2006.  The 
passage of this law was ultimately smoothed by reforms in areas of particular 
                                            
58 More recently the introduction of the new bankruptcy law has been praised by EU Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson in a speech of 10 July 2007, although he also noted that there was 
some way to go towards recognition of market status, notably in removing barriers to access to the 
Chinese market and in the protection of intellectual property requirements.  The text of the speech 
is available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm162_en.htm 
accessed 29 January 2008.  
59 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community, Article 2(7)(b).   
concern, including in relation to the social security system,60 and by reforms to 
uneconomic SOEs, outlined above.  Steps have also been taken to protect the 
position of the banks.   
 
The availability of appropriate and effectively functioning insolvency laws will enable 
investors and creditors to plan their dealings with Chinese companies more 
effectively and to have confidence that in the event of insolvency the proceedings 
will be conducted fairly and that fraudulent dealings or unfair preferences will be 
tackled.  This stability can promote investment that might not otherwise take 
place,61 although in addition to the presence of such laws it will be necessary that 
there is a sufficient prospect of their application and enforcement.  Around $60bn 
                                            
60 See K Lin and O Kangas, “Social Policymaking and its Institutional Basis: Transition of the 
Chinese Social Security System” (2006) 59 International Social Security Review 61; Joe CB Leung, “Social 
Security Reforms in China: Issues and Prospects” (2003) 12 International Journal of Social Welfare 73. 
61 The European Bank for Restructuring and Development has noted a correlation between the 
effectiveness of a country’s bankruptcy laws and the level of foreign direct investment in that country: 
[Spring 2000] Law in Transition 43.  See also R La Porta, F Lopez de Silanes, A Shleifer and RW 
Vishny, “Legal Determinants of External Finance” (1997) 53 Journal of Finance 1131 and C J Tabb and 
A Curtis Campbell “The Importance of Bankruptcy Law to Economic Development and Implications 
for China” (2006) 22 Insolvency Law and Practice 98.  A vom Eigen, "China's New Bankruptcy Law 
Encourages Investment" (2006) 25 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 8 notes the possible impact of 
the new law. 
was invested in China in both 2004 and 2005 and this amount looks set to rise in 
2006.  However an absence of stability can place the economic system in danger of 
a sudden withdrawal of foreign investment, leading to an economic crisis.62  
Hitherto the state has sought to provide stability by maintaining strong control on 
the economy.  However with accession to the WTO the difficulty of this task will 
increase, moreover the expectation of foreign investors63 will be that the rule of law 
                                            
62  B Eichengreen, Toward a New Financial Architecture (Washington DC, Institute for 
International Economics, 1999), 28. 
63 Foreign investors may have differing attitudes to this issue however and the existence of the 
rule of law is more likely to be a factor influencing the decisions of Western investors, some 
concerns for whom are highlighted by L Wilson, “Investors Beware: the WTO Will not Cure All Ills 
with China” [2003] Columbia Business Law Review 1007.  It is significant that China has benefited to 
large extent from investment by Chinese diasporic subjects, encouraged by Deng Xiaoping.  The 
driving force for such investment may be culturally different from that of Western investors, being 
based on personal connections and patriotism, in addition to the desire to turn a profit, and such 
investors have been able to find solutions to problems without recourse to the law.  These matters 
are explored by Maggi WH Leung, “From “Bamboo Networks” to Transnational Hi-tech Linkages: 
Overseas Chinese as Agents for Economic Development in the PRC”, paper presented at the XVI 
Conference of the European Association of Chinese Studies, Ljubljana, 1 September 2006 (paper on 
file with authors), citing one estimate that investment from overseas Chinese represents 70 to 80 per 
cent of FDI in China.  These issues are also touched upon in S Lubman, "Looking for Law in China" 
(2006) 20 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1, 51-2. 
will hold sway and property rights will be upheld.64  The challenge in the continued 
liberalisation of the economy will be to replace state control with these and other 
stabilising mechanisms including sound corporate governance mechanisms, as a 
means of minimising the potential for corporate collapses, and the effective 
employment of corporate rescue procedures to handle such collapses. 
 
Corporate rescue procedures are emphasised under the new law that, for the first 
time, will be available to businesses that are not owned by the state.  Corporate 
rescue laws enable struggling but viable companies to recover economic stability, or 
at least to retain economic value by preserving the company’s business for sale to 
another enterprise.65  Belcher defines the concept as “a major intervention 
necessary to avert the eventual failure of the company”66 and notes that this term 
can encompass both formal and informal rescue processes.  The focus in this article 
will primarily be on formal processes.  Such processes commonly provide the 
company with temporary protection from creditors, so that efforts to find a solution 
to the company’s financial difficulties are not undermined by demands from 
                                            
64 It is notable, however, that significant investment has been already been attracted in spite of 
an apparent absence of the rule of law.  See R Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002), 462-475 for an evaluation of possible explanations and Lubman, 
supra n 63 for a discussion of ways in which investors cope in the absence of the rule of law..   
65 For a detailed discussion, see A Belcher, supra n 52; and V Finch, supra n 52, Ch. 6. 
66 A Belcher, ibid, 4. 
creditors; a framework for the negotiation of a plan for the fulfilment of the 
company’s obligations; and voting procedures for the implementation of this plan.  
The company will either be managed by its existing management (debtor in 
possession proceedings), with or without supervision by a qualified insolvency 
professional, or such a professional will assume control of the company (termed by 
Finch as “practitioner in possession” proceedings).67  The procedures may be 
subject to oversight by a court.68  
 
The new Chinese laws are part of a global trend of developments in this area.  
Increasing attention worldwide has been focussed on the development of optimal 
corporate rescue laws and the Chinese draftsmen took account of the work done in 
this area.  Reforms have taken place throughout Europe,69 also in countries such as 
the United States,70 Japan,71 Mexico,72 Brazil,73 and Turkey74.  The World Bank has 
                                            
67 V Finch, “Control and Co-ordination in Corporate Rescue” (2005) 25 Legal Studies 374, 374-
5. 
68 See World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, 
(Revised 2005), C14.1 for an overview of desirable features of a corporate rescue system. 
69  See K Gromek Broc and R Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue, An Overview of Recent Developments 
from Selected Countries in Europe (The Hague, Kluwer, 2004). 
70  PB Lewis, “Corporate Rescue Law in the United States” in K Gromek Broc and R Parry 
(eds), supra n 53, Ch 16. 
been a key player in pushing for reforms to corporate insolvency laws worldwide 
and has, in conjunction with UNCITRAL, has developed Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems.  It emerges strongly from the reform 
process that no appropriate “one size fits all” approach to such laws can be 
devised.75  For example the World Bank/UNCITRAL Principles and Guidelines 
provide a very skeletal approach, reflecting the importance of adaptation in light of 
national differences.  Account must be taken of the political, social, cultural, 
institutional and economic environment in each country.  Corporate rescue laws do 
not operate in a vacuum, but are shaped by diverse factors including conceptions of 
                                                                                                                             
71 For an overview see Hon SL Bufford and K Yanagida, "Japan's Revised Laws on Business 
Reorganization: An Analysis" (2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 1. 
72 Ley du Concursos Mercantiles of May 13 2000, discussed in Luis Manuel C. Méjan, “The 
Genesis, Structure and Projection of the New Mexican Insolvency Law” (2001) 17 Connecticut Journal 
of International Law 79. 
73 Law No. 11.101 of February 9, 2005. 
74 Law No. 4949 Amending the Turkish Bankruptcy and Execution Law, Official Gazette 30 July 
2003 and numbered 25184; numbered 5092 Amending the Turkish Bankruptcy and Execution Law, 
Official Gazette 21 February 2004, numbered 25380. 
75 In this regard it is perhaps notable that the European Union chose to adopt the open 
method of coordination in relation to insolvency laws, compared with the maximum harmonization 
approach envisaged for areas of consumer protection and capital market laws e.g. EU Directive on 
the company, the corporate governance system, the persuasive influence of the 
banking sector, the level of paternalism of the state, and the culture of company 
managers.  Therefore it is not feasible for a mature system of corporate rescue 
laws to be merely transplanted into a developing legal system without considered 
and appropriate modification.76   
 
The new corporate rescue laws will be particularly important if the country 
undergoes a period of financial turbulence, caused by an increase in the price of raw 
materials, a loss of demand for products, or a slump in foreign investment, when it 
will be important for adequate corporate rescue laws to be in place.  The impact of 
the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 was worsened by a lack of adequate corporate 
rescue laws, which made the rehabilitation of struggling companies more difficult.  
There were insufficient mechanisms to protect companies by granting to them a 
period of breathing space in which to get their affairs in order and to facilitate fresh 
financing that would invigorate the enterprise by granting such financing priority in 
                                                                                                                             
the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services (2002/65/EC); and the EU Prospectus 
Directive (2003/71/EC).  See R Parry, “Introduction”, in Gromek Broc and Parry, supra n 6969, 5-8. 
76 On the problems and strategies of transplantation see F Dahan and J Dine, “Transplantation 
for Transition — Discussion on a Concept Around Russian Reform of the Law on Reorganisation” 
(2003) 23 Legal Studies 284. 
the queue for payment.77  Moreover corporate rescue laws are needed in a market 
orientated economy regardless of the economic climate, as even when the economy 
is healthy some enterprises will inevitably experience financial distress, due to poor 
management, fraud, or poor cash flow, but with appropriate assistance they can 
often be restored to viability. 
 
 
E. THE CORPORATE RESCUE CULTURE IN CHINA’S NEW ENTERPRISE 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 2006 
Although the new law marks a transition from planned bankruptcies to market based 
proceedings, it would be naïve to think that the scope for state interference in 
proceedings has disappeared completely.  As discussed below, significant potential 
for state control arises through the judiciary and through the appointment of an 
administrator.78 
 
                                            
77 See M Pomerleano and W Shaw, Corporate Restructuring: Lessons from Experience (World 
Bank, 2005), 101-125. 
78 The term “administrator” is used by Tang, supra n 23, para. 5.38; EJ Chua, “China’s Central 
Government Sets Short Timetable For Bankruptcy Law Reform” (2005) 20 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 611; Wang, supra n 27, section 4.3 
The discussion below will concentrate on a number of key aspects of the new law, 
relating to 1) conditions of access to the proceedings; 2) the process of 
administration of the opening of proceedings; 3) the treatment of those affected by 
the insolvency; 4) the governance of the proceedings and 5) the framework for the 
agreement of a rescue plan.  Although the focus is on the rescue procedures, 
reference will be made, where appropriate, to the liquidation regime.  The 
presence of effective liquidation procedures will potentially encourage company 
managers to seek the alternative of corporate rescue at an early stage.  In addition, 
a major incentive for creditors to support corporate rescue proceedings is the 
potentially better return that they will receive by agreeing to the plan proposed by 
the debtor, compared with what they would receive in liquidation. There will then 
follow in Part D a discussion of some additional factors relevant to the specific 
situation of China that will present challenges in the operation of the new law and 
may limit its immediate impact.  It is notable that the operation of the law in 
practice may bring some surprises in its operation.  Further revisions to the law 
may be necessitated, as shown by the experience of a great many mature bankruptcy 
systems which have recently undergone reforms.79 
 
                                            
79 See Gromek Broc and Parry (eds), supra n 69; and Gromek Broc and Parry (eds), supra n 53. 
1. Access to the proceedings 
One strength of the new law is that it has removed the obstacles to the 
commencement of bankruptcy and reorganisation proceedings which were 
prescribed by the previous law.80  The new law is to apply to a greater range of 
businesses with the status of “legal person”: namely SOEs, non SOEs and financial 
institutions but not individuals and partnerships.81  In keeping with the market 
based nature of the new law, there is no requirement of government conse
bankruptcy proceedings, and accordingly the resettlement of employees will not be a 
central concern.  On the fact of it the new law should not therefore be subject to 
the same distortions as under the 1986 law.  However, as discussed below, it likely 
that these factors will still be present in practice in the operation of the new law.   
nt to 
                                           
 
A company will be eligible for bankruptcy proceedings, either liquidation or rescue, if 
it cannot pay its due debts and either its assets are insufficient to enable it to meet 
all of its debts or it evidently lacks repayment capacity.82 The requirements of these 
elements will need to be fleshed out in time, since it is unclear for example if one 
unpaid invoice of a significant value will suffice as evidence of a company's inability to 
 
80 The former requirement of managerial misconduct is gone, which removes a significant 
obstacle to the implementation of proceedings.   
81 2006 Law, Article 2. 
82 Ibid. See J Shi, supra n 24, 657-8. 
meet its debts, or if a more significant range of evidence of such inability is required.  
Notably both elements must be satisfied, which may limit access to the proceedings.  
In addition, there will be another route for reorganisation proceedings if it can be 
shown that the debtor is obviously likely to lose repayment capacity.   
 
Under this law the company or a creditor must apply to the court for bankruptcy 
proceedings.  The reorganisation procedure can be invoked directly based on the 
petition presented either by the company or a creditor to the court. In addition, in 
the circumstances where a creditor has applied to the court for bankruptcy, the 
debtor or the shareholders who contribute to more than 10% of the registered 
capital of the company are able to petition for rescue before the court declares 
bankruptcy of the debtor.83  Early implementation of rescue proceedings will 
normally lead to a more successful outcome than if proceedings are delayed, since 
the company will be shielded from the demands of creditors at an early stage and 
the timely provision of expert help can prevent problems from ballooning.84  At 
least in the short term however there may be problems in opening proceedings at a 
sufficiently early stage.  It is likely that there will be a lack of awareness of the 
potential for rescue.  In addition business managers may be reluctant to admit that 
                                            
83 2006 Law, Article 70, see also Y Xu, The Speech on Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Beijing, Law 
Press-China, 2006), 301 (in Chinese). 
84 Wang, supra n 27, section 2.4. 
their business is in difficulties and they may fear that they will lose their jobs if 
proceedings are initiated.85   
 
Might the impetus for early action come from creditors?  Statistics indicate that 
among listed companies around 30% of financing comes from bank loans and 45% 
from other sources, including funds raised from issues of shares and bonds.86  As 
noted above, rates of bank lending to the private sector have been low but are 
increasing.  Such businesses commonly raise capital from friends and family, from 
private equity and from loans.  The rules on which companies may issue bonds have 
recently been liberalised87 and so it may be expected that there will be a rise in such 
financing.   However it has also been predicted that informal financing within the 
private sector may be durable.88  Some creditors may be reluctant to go to court 
owing to a cultural aversion to litigation, and a lack of confidence in the judiciary, 
arising from weaknesses in the legal infrastructure.89  Moreover there has 
                                            
85 BG Carruthers and TC Halliday, Rescuing Business (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), 249-251; 
R Parry, “Introduction”, in Gromek Broc and Parry (eds), supra n 69, 14. 
86 Allen et al, supra n 46, 80. 
87 Gu Minkang, Understanding Chinese Company Law (Hong Kong University Press, 2006), p.334-
5. 
88 Kelle Tsai, supra n 47, 262-263. 
89 On the limits of the rule of law in China see SB Lubman, Bird in a Cage - Legal Reform in China 
After Mao (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999); Peerenboom, supra n 64.  See also C de Vera, 
historically been pride among many Chinese citizens in the absence of bankruptcy 
from the economy.90  However it may be that a culture of intervention will develop 
among the banking sector, in particular since the banking market has been opened 
up.  The development of early intervention will be important, as delay may be 
caused to such an extent that the optimal time for the implementation of rescue 
proceedings will be missed, or even that the company will no longer be salvageable.   
 
2. Administration of the opening of proceedings  
Once the application has been filed the court will then decide within 15 days 
whether to grant a request for liquidation proceedings, although this time limit can 
                                                                                                                             
“Arbitrating Harmony, 'Med-Arb' and the Confluence of Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of 
International Commercial Disputes in China” (2004) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 149, 174 on cultural 
reasons for an aversion to litigation and a preference for arbitration.  See also BKY Wong, “Chinese 
Law Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution” (2000) 30 Hong Kong Law Journal 304, 
316-7.  However H Lu and TD Miethe note that “the Chinese public has increasingly turned to legal 
redress for dispute resolution in record numbers since the economic reforms. For example, the 
number of civil disputes adjudicated in courts has nearly tripled between 1988 and 2000 (from 1.2 
million to 3.4 million), whereas lawsuits filed against state agencies for unfair or illegal administrative 
decisions have increased tenfold (from 8,573 cases to 85,760) during this time period”.  See 
“Confessions and Criminal Case Disposition in China” (2003) 37 Law and Society Review 549, 554 
citing the Law Yearbook of China (1988, 2001). 
90 Gu Minkang, supra n 87, 279. 
be extended to another 15 days after the approval of the upper-level court.91  
There is no time limit within which a court must decide whether or not to grant the 
petition for reorganisation.  This may prove to be a problem because there is no 
statutory moratorium in the period from the date when the petition is presented to 
the date when the sanction for reorganisation is made by court.92  The company 
may therefore be vulnerable, in particular if the opening of proceedings is delayed. 
 
The court has a wide discretion to decide whether or not to sanction reorganization 
proceedings.  The principles that it should observe in reaching its decision have not 
been elaborated and consequently the courts would appear to have considerable 
margin to influence the conduct of proceedings, which could lead to distortions in 
the use of these procedures.93  It is submitted that this lack of guidelines may 
enable the court to become the main obstacle to the use of these procedures.  
                                            
91 See the 2006 Law, Article 10. 
92 Although a moratorium inevitably interferes with the property rights of creditors it is an 
essential tool facilitating a resolution of the difficulties of companies in most corporate rescue 
systems.  See generally Carruthers and Halliday, supra n 85, p 40-42; and D Milman, “Moratoria on 
Enforcement Rights: Revisiting Corporate Rescue” [2004] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 89. Finch, 
supra n 52, 206-207, offers a brief review of moratoria provision in different jurisdictions. 
93  See Carruthers and Halliday, supra n 85, 480-3, describing problems of political cronyism in 
the United States bankruptcy judiciary and for a more recent study of distortions caused by the 
courts system LM Lo Pucki, Courting Failure (Ann Arbour, University of Michigan Press, 2006). 
Under the current political and legal environment, government authority m
considerable pressure on the judiciary,
ay exert 
                                           
94 in spite of the fundamental importance of 
judicial independence under the Chinese Constitution. In contrast, the 
reorganisation provisions are drafted in a manner that indicates that if the court 
considers that the application meets the requirements of the legislation it has no 
discretion and it must make an order for reorganisation.95  However it will take 
time for the judiciary to develop expertise and experience in handling corporate 
rescue cases. 
 
The court has a monopoly over the appointment of an administrator to manage the 
debtor’s affairs,96 reflecting the view that the administrator has an independent 
function and is not merely a representative of creditors. 97  However a creditors’ 
meeting will also be established, and this body is entitled to apply to the court for a 
change of administrator if it can argue that the administrator is not capable of 
discharging his duties legally and impartially, or that he is incompetent at his work, 
but only the court has the final say.98  Little guidance as to the appointment process 
 
94 Peerenboom, supra n 64, 18. 
95 2006 Law, Article 71.  J Shi, supra n 24, 667. 
96 2006 Law, Article 22. 
97 J Shi, supra n 24, 663. 
98 See the 2006 Law, Article 22.  Y Xu, The Speech on Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Beijing, Law 
Press-China, 2006), 185-186 (in Chinese). 
is given in the legislation but Provisions on the Appointment of Administrators in 
Hearing Bankruptcy cases have issued by the Supreme Peoples Court.  These 
Provisions indicate that a roster of administrators should be established locally from 
which the court should make an appointment by random means, which is in the 
interests of the integrity of the proceedings.  A competitive bidding process will be 
employed in relation to cases that are complex and significant and one fear may be 
that this element of the appointment process could be manipulated.  In recognition 
of the complexities of insolvencies of financial institutions, regulatory bodies will 
make a recommendation in respect of the appointment in such cases. 
 
Notably the debtor may apply to manage the estate with administrator support, 
under “debtor in possession” proceedings.  The availability of debtor in possession 
proceedings is an innovation for China and is potentially useful as a means of getting 
the business into the bankruptcy proceedings at a sufficiently early stage.99  
Experience demonstrates that the sooner the rescue proceedings are implemented 
the better the chances are of a successful rescue.  The management of the company 
may be more inclined to seek help if they stand a chance of remaining in post.  In 
contrast they may be deterred from seeking help if they know that they will be 
displaced by an outsider coming in to take control of the firm.  The debtor in 
possession model that has been adopted is not as extensive as under the United 
                                            
99 2006 Law, Article 73. 
States Chapter 11 procedure, since the debtor will be supervised by an 
administrator, however it is a significant step forward nonetheless.  Since debtor in 
possession proceedings have no precedent in China it may take some time before 
there is acceptance of proceedings whereby the managers who were in place during 
the company's downfall are able to stay in place during the reorganisation. 
 
There is scope for continued state control over proceeding through the 
appointment of the administrator, since the liquidation panel, which is composed of 
officials from government authorities, can be nominated to occupy this role. This 
may be because currently there are still more than 2,000 debt-laden SOEs with no 
possibility of rehabilitation and the government intends to keep the process of 
bankruptcy of these enterprises completely under control.  The position of 
administrator is also open to persons such as liquidators, lawyers, accountants or 
other professionals with requisite knowledge and qualifications in public agencies.100  
Under the new law, the administrator need not be a natural person, therefore a 
legally established law firm, accounting firm or bankruptcy and liquidation firm can be 
appointed.   
 
The involvement of an administrator can maximise the chances of a successful 
rescue, since the administrator may have experience of similar cases, and as an 
                                            
100 The 2006 Law, Article 24. 
outsider they may be able to identify weaknesses in the management or the business 
that can be addressed in the reorganisation proceedings.  However, at least in the 
short term, there will be a shortage of experienced professionals and this could 
hamper the progress of the new law.  An exception could be Shenzhen where a 
relatively sophisticated bankruptcy regime has been in operation, although 
experience of corporate rescue is limited even there.  In Eastern Europe the 
expertise of insolvency professionals from mature systems was drawn upon and this 
is a model that it would be advisable for China to follow.    
 
The administrator or, in debtor in possession proceedings, the debtor, must submit 
to the court and creditors’ meeting a draft reorganisation plan within six months of 
reorganisation being ordered.101  This timescale is relatively generous in comparison 
with those applicable under some other systems, such as the basic eight week 
timescale under the UK administration regime,102 or the 120 day period in which a 
Chapter 11 debtor may exclusively file a plan in the US,103 and there is provision for 
the period to be prolonged for another three months with the approval of the court 
if there is reasonable cause, such as in a complex case.  Details of the duration of 
the plan are not specified.  This is a matter that has been left for the market to 
                                            
101 The 2006 Law, Article 79.  
102 IA 1986, Sch B1,49(5), inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002. 
103 11 USC § 1121(b). 
determine, as the duration will be determined by negotiation between the debtor 
and its creditors.104  The reorganisation proceedings will be terminated upon the 
approval of the plan by the court.   
 
Creditors who have submitted claims form part of a creditors’ meeting and this 
meeting may select a creditors’ committee to exercise supervisory powers in 
respect of the management of the debtor’s estate.105  At the meeting creditors will 
be grouped into four classes: secured creditors; claims to wages and various social 
and insurance claims; tax claims; and general unsecured creditors.  The terms of the 
legislation would appear to enable bondholders to participate in the creditors’ 
meeting, but not shareholders.  The administrator can exercise managerial powers 
without having to report to the court and although he must report to the creditors’ 
committee,106 the committee has no powers to annul the actions of the 
administrator and it is unable to remove the administrator, that power being 
exercisable only by the court.  The influence of the creditors’ committee may 
                                            
104 A reorganisation plan which has been approved by each class of creditors’ meeting and then 
confirmed by the court will have binding effect on the debtor and all the creditors. See the 2006 Law, 
Articles 84 and 92. 
105 The creditors’ representatives and an employee representative or a representative of 
workers. See article 67 of the 2006 Law. 
106 2006 Law, Articles 68 and 69. 
therefore be limited, which can strengthen state control over proceedings in cases 
where it is exercised.   
 
Previously bankruptcy proceedings were subject to a requirement of local 
government approval, which is no longer the case under the new law, however, 
there may still be scope for regional political influence.  The new law, as under the 
former law, provides that proceedings are to be heard in the place where the debtor 
is domiciled.107  The proceedings could be distorted if local factors, such as the 
potential impact of the proceedings on local employment are taken into account.  
Although it is desirable for rescue proceedings to maximise the number of 
employees who are retained, if too many employees are kept on the chances of 
rescue could be badly hampered. In practice, local government has sought to 
maintain stability through interference with the decisions of local courts, which are 
unable to exercise their judicial power independently.  In particular there is the 
potential for local protectionism which is detrimental to creditors’ interests, 
particularly the creditors from other regions.108 
 
                                            
107 2006 Law, Article 3. 
108 For more details see S Cao, “The Legislation and Implementation of the Chinese Bankruptcy 
Law in the Past Ten Years” (1997) 57 Study of Contemporary China (in Chinese). 
3. Balancing of interests of those affected by the proceedings  
Insolvency proceedings require difficult choices to be made regarding the allocation 
of a struggling company’s assets.  Several interest groups are affected: the 
company’s creditors, both secured and unsecured; its managers; its shareholders; its 
employees; and the local community.  Effective governance of proceedings entails a 
balancing of the interests of these groups.  The allocation of entitlements of 
creditors in liquidation proceedings has been a particularly contentious aspect of the 
drafting process, as there has been some debate about the order in which creditors 
should be paid.  Under Article 113 of the new law two separate sets of assets are 
established.  One set consists of assets that are covered by security.  The secured 
creditors are entitled to realise their claims from the proceeds of such assets.  The 
other set of assets comprises the so-called bankruptcy estate which should be 
distributed among the remaining interest groups in the following order: respectively, 
expenses of the proceedings, employees’ claims, tax claims and ordinary creditors’ 
claims. 
 
The debate that arose during the drafting process was as to the priority of secured 
claims and employment claims.  Financial interest groups argued that the bankruptcy 
proceedings should not serve the function of the social security system.109  On the 
                                            
109 In mature insolvency systems the priority of secured credit is justified by reference to 
creditors having bargained to obtain priority; having offered sufficiently attractive terms to the debtor 
other hand trade unions emphasised the important role of employees in the 
economy in the PRC: a fundamental principle of the Chinese Constitution is that the 
working class is the ruling class. 110  A compelling argument is that employees can 
least afford to lose what they are owed, which, in cases in which adequate social 
welfare provision is unavailable, explains their priority ahead of tax claims and the 
claims of trade creditors.111   In light of the inadequate nature of the Chinese social 
security system at present it is arguable that greater provision might have been 
made, at least until such time as the system is improved. 
 
4. Governance of the proceedings 
A significant concern of creditors will be that the proceedings are governed fairly 
and that robust laws are available and applied to counteract fraudulent conduct prior 
to, and during, the proceedings.  The appointment of the administrator potentially 
                                                                                                                             
in exchange for this security; and having by registration given notice to other creditors of the 
presence of security: R Goode, “Is the Law Too Favourable to Secured Creditors?” (1983-4) 8 
Canadian Business Law Journal 53 and for a more recent critical evaluations Finch, supra n 52, 452-9 
and R Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law- Theory and Application (Oxford University Press, 2005), Ch 5. 
110 Chinese Constitution 1982, article 1. 
111 In contrast, in systems where adequate social security provision is available, it is argued that 
employee priority is unnecessary: A Keay and P Walton, “The Preferential Debts Regime in 
Liquidation Law” (1999) 3 The Company, Financial, and Insolvency Law Review 84, 100. 
serves to constrain and supervise the actions of directors.  As noted above the 
directors may potentially stay in post during the proceedings, however there are 
restrictions on their conduct.  Under Article 15 they are required to keep 
appropriately the company’s property, books, documents and seals.  They are 
required to exercise their power according to the requirements of court and 
administrator and to attend the creditors’ meeting, answering any questions with 
honesty.  Failure to attend the meeting without justifiable reason will lead to a fine.  
Similarly fines may be imposed if the books and accounts are not presented.  In 
addition they may not leave their place of domicile without the permission of the 
people’s court and they are prevented from taking up a position as a director, 
supervisor or member of senior management staff in other enterprises.   
 
The creditors’ committee provides an additional layer of governance that can serve a 
role in guarding against corruption.112  The committee has roles in supervising the 
management and disposal of the debtor’s assets and the distribution of the insolvent 
estate.  It has a right to demand an explanation from the debtor or the 
administrator and it can require documentary evidence to be produced.  There is a 
more limited supervisory role for shareholders in the enterprise, who are able to 
attend the creditors’ meeting and discuss the draft reorganisation plan, but they are 
unable to vote.   
                                            
112 The 2006 Law, article 68. 
 Some protection against wrongdoing is presented in the shape of provisions for the 
avoidance of transactions.  In liquidation proceedings such laws may be 
characterised as maintaining and enforcing the system of entitlements to assets.113  
In rescue proceedings they serve to maximise the company’s assets for use in the 
proceedings.  Under these laws post bankruptcy payments of pre bankruptcy debts 
are invalidated, as is the collection, assessment or recovery of such debts, unless 
such payments could favour the reorganisation and benefit the debtor’s assets.114  
The administrator or the debtor in possession may exercise powers for the 
avoidance of certain transactions entered into by the debtor prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings.  The provisions contain the main 
types of avoidance provision that are found in insolvency systems worldwide: laws 
that target fraudulent transfers of property occurring within one year before the 
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and also unfairly preferential 
payments to individual creditor within six months prior to the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings where the debtor knew that making the payment would 
cause it to be unable to pay its debts and where the payment damages the interests 
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supra n 109, Ch 9. 
114 See Article 32 of the 2006 Law. 
of other creditors.115  The administrator is entitled to recover assets which have 
been illegally drawn and appropriated by directors, supervisors or senior 
management staff who have taken advantage of their position and power.116  
However the effectiveness of these laws may be undermined for the foreseeable 
future by weaknesses in the judicial system.  This is a potential problem that must 
be addressed.  In the event of the laws not being applied effectively, or being 
subject to corruption and interference, confidence in the insolvency system as a 
whole will be undermined and this may have a consequential negative impact on 
investment. 
 
The law also includes measures that enable company managers to be brought to 
account.  According to Article 125, the directors, supervisors or senior 
management staff who fail to discharge their duty faithfully and diligently, leading to 
the bankruptcy of the debtor enterprise, will incur personal civil liability.  
Meanwhile, they will be disqualified from being director, supervisor or senior 
manager in any enterprise in the three years following the date on which the 
bankruptcy proceedings are terminated.  These laws can contribute to the 
prevention of financial difficulties through the deterrence of wrongful behaviour, 
although again these effects will depend on adequate enforcement. 
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 The reorganization proceedings can be terminated in various circumstances.  These 
include if the business and financial state of the debtor continues to deteriorate and 
there is no reasonable prospect that the debtor can be rescued.117  They can also 
be terminated in various instances of wrongdoing, namely where the debtor acts 
fraudulently; causes an illicit reduction of assets; or engages in other behaviour that 
obviously infringes the interests of creditors.  The proceedings may also be ended if 
the administrator cannot discharge his duties because of the debtor's conduct. 
5. Implementation of a rescue plan 
The plan will be regarded as having been passed by each voting group if more than 
half of the creditors in that group that are present at the meeting give their approval, 
on condition that the value of claims of those creditors amounts to more than two 
thirds of the value of that group.118  If the reorganisation plan has a direct impact on 
their investments, a special group of investors will be established outside the 
creditors’ meeting to vote.119 Although they may decline to approve the plan, in light 
of the relatively high thresholds for approval, the court enjoys cramdown powers 
and may approve the plan if the adjustment of the investors’ rights is considered to 
                                            
117 2006 Law, Article 78. 
118 2006 Law, Article 84. 
119 2006 Law, Article 85. 
be fair and justifiable.120  A plan that fails to gain approval will result in the failure of 
the rescue attempt and the liquidation of the company. 
 
It should be noted that the new law introduces DIP financing which could facilitate 
reorganizations by enabling the debtor to borrow money from banks and potential 
lenders by using its unencumbered assets to secure a post-petition loan.121 If the ne
financing is used to pay the wages and social welfare claims of the employees durin
the period of continued trading, the finance provider will rank ahead of the existing
creditors with the exception of other secured creditors.
w 
g 
 
tive 
                                           
122 In other words, this 
creditor does not obtain super-priority status ahead of all existing creditors in the 
order of distribution.  As a result, although the new law gives the banks an incen
to lend to a financially distressed enterprise, this incentive is very limited, and this 
could be problematic. On the whole, the Chinese state banks are unwilling to 
advance loans to troubled firms. One survey indicates that, even in the ordinary 
course of business, nearly 90 per cent of medium and small sized enterprises face 
problems in raising funds from state banks in China, and so the prospects for 
 
120 2006 Law, Article 87. 
121 2006 Law, Article 75 (2). 
122 2006 Law, Article 42 (4); Weiguo Wang, The Sum and Substance of Bankruptcy Law (Law Press-
China 2007), p124. 
companies in financial difficulties will be extremely limited.123 The introduction of 
super-priority financing to encourage banks and potential lenders to provide financial 
support for rescue attempts may be considered in future.124 
 
In addition, a statutory moratorium takes effect in reorganisation proceedings to 
freeze creditors’ rights of enforcement, so that the company may have breathing 
space to negotiate with creditors and draft the rescue plan. The period of the 
automatic stay starts from declaration of the court’s order on granting the 
commencement of reorganisation and continues until the termination of the 
reorganisation proceedings. There is no fixed time limit on the period of 
moratorium.  However a potentially significant weakness is that this moratorium 
does not cover the period from the petition for reorganisation being submitted to 
the petition being accepted and approved by the court.  The prospects of a 
successful rescue could be damaged significantly if the company is not protected 
from the actions of creditors at this time of vulnerability. 
 
                                            
123 This survey was made by Standard Chartered and Chinese Academy of Social Science in 2007 
under the support of Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, and the involvement 
of more than 400 medium and small sized enterprises. 
124 J Shi, supra n 24, 645, 669. 
From the perspective of judicial practice in the past eight months since the new law 
was implemented on June 1st 2007, it appears that the new law is not as yet being 
widely used. Although, the Supreme People’s Court has not released official statistics 
publicly, some influential scholars have opined that the new law is not as effective 
and well running as they initially expected.125  The inadequacies and legal 
uncertainties which have been analysed above may slow the progress of 
implementation.  The Supreme People’s Court has recently organized a special 
committee to produce a practicable judicial interpretation in order to flesh out the 
technical shortcomings of the new law and to resolve the problems which emerge in 
practice.  
F. REMAINING CHALLENGES TO A SUCCESSFUL SYSTEM OF 
CORPORATE RESCUE LAWS IN CHINA 
In addition to the possible shortcomings of the law itself, there is still significant 
progress to be made in several areas, including as noted above the development of 
professional skills and experience by those who will be responsible for the practical 
operation of the law.  The impact of the new law is likely to be delayed as a result.  
Further key challenges include those discussed below. 
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 1. Inadequate legal infrastructure 
A lack of suitable governance structures to impose the rule of law can lead to bias in 
decision making, a failure to see through decisions that have been made, or more 
seriously corruption and a consequent loss of value in relation to businesses that 
undergo insolvency procedures.126  Arguably the fact that China has one ruling 
party which, although subject to some supervision by eight democratic parties,127 has
the final say on any decision making should not necessarily stand in the way of 
economic prosperity.  The example of Singapore, as a de facto one party state, is 
evidence that good economic governance can thrive in the absence of a two-party 
multi-party political climate.  However state interference in bankruptcy proceedings
may continue with the judiciary as a conduit, since the judiciary are appointed by 
government and the budget of the court is determined by the government.  A 
trained and regulated system of insolvency professionals, supported by a judiciary 
independent of government interference is a minimum requirement.  Preferably 
bankruptcy proceedings should be handled by specialist courts: currently they are 
 
or 
 
the 
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127 Democratic parties are entitled to be involved in the legislation and policies of decision-
making, to discuss domestic and foreign affairs, provide suggestions to the executive party and 
supervise the actions of Communist party. However the Communist party firmly has control over the 
final say in any decision-making. This is the so-called “democracy centralism” (min zhu ji zhong zhi). 
dealt with by Second Civil Trial branches of local courts and intermediate courts.128  
A level of experience in dealing with bankruptcy cases can only be developed over 
time and the courts hitherto will have been constrained by government influence, 
the newness of the legislation and the relatively limited number of bankruptcy cases 
that will have come their way, let alone cases involving the rescue procedures.  In 
contrast the Intermediate People’s Court of Shenzhen has operated a specialist 
bankruptcy division since 1993.  During this time it has handled a high volume of 
cases and has developed streamlined procedures and policies.129  This expertise can 
be drawn upon as the new bankruptcy law develops elsewhere, although it has been 
observed that the Shenzhen judiciary has failed to develop a sufficient culture of 
corporate rescue,130 so that recourse may need to be had to experts from other 
countries or jurisdictions,131 such as Hong Kong. 
 
2. An inadequate social welfare system 
A significant challenge is presently presented by the weakness of the social safety 
net.  An improved social security system was unveiled in a White Paper in 2002 but 
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129 Zhang and Booth, supra n 18, 8. 
130 Zhang and Booth, supra n 18, 24. 
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has been described as inadequate,132 benefiting urban workers but not those in rural 
areas, who are regarded as capable of self sufficiency.  The amounts paid are often 
inadequate in the face of rising prices, medical expenses and family commitments.  If 
the new law has an immediate impact it could lead to an acceleration of job losses 
through the use of both liquidation and rescue, which would strain the system.   
Social unrest could arise if no suitable alternative employment opportunities were 
available and an insufficient living allowance was available.133  This is perhaps the key 
reason why the law is unlikely to be allowed to reach its full effect immediately. 
 
3. Pressures on the banking sector   
 
The new law can potentially bring about significant changes in the way in which non 
performing loans to SOEs are handled and it will test the effectiveness of the steps 
that have been taken to reform the banking sector.  Such steps were not taken until 
relatively recently, most notably following the 1997 Asian financial crisis.134  Asset 
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management companies were established to acquire non performing loans from key 
banks in exchange for the issue of government backed bonds.135 SOE restructuring 
was also employed to convert bad debts owed by failing enterprises into a fresh loan 
to a viable enterprise.136   
 
The position of banks was also undermined by difficulties commonly encountered in 
the enforcement of security.137  At the initial stage of transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy, the prospects of enforcement of security were 
particularly weak. First, there was no legislation on security interests until 1994 in 
which the first guarantee law was promulgated.  Secondly, there was an intense 
debate on the attribution of state-owned assets as to whether they were still owned 
by the state or should belong to the enterprise. Although under the principle of 
                                            
135 The AMCs were modelled on the United States Resolution Trust Corporation that had been 
deployed to liquidate assets of savings and loan companies declared insolvent by the Office of Thrift 
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would make a fresh loan, which would then pass the sums received to the old company to discharge 
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achieved ahead of other creditors.  See the comments of Booth, supra n 34, 23-24. 
137 Booth, supra n 34, 23. 
separate corporate personality, the assets which are authorised to the SOEs are 
clearly the property of the enterprises themselves and these enterprises will assume 
liabilities by using these assets independently.  Currently, however, enforcement 
against state-owned assets is severely restricted and controlled under the 
supervision of specific government authorities. Thirdly, the state owned banks did 
not have the incentive to enforce their security, because such enforcement would be 
metaphorically like money passing from the left pocket to right pocket.  
 
The ability of creditors to take security can lead to credit becoming available that 
would not otherwise be forthcoming, or becoming available at a lower price than 
would otherwise be the case.  China has paved the way for creditors with reforms 
to its system of security interests however the package of benefits that are 
presented to the holder of such security do not reach the level enjoyed by creditors 
in many other jurisdictions.  The benefits brought by the availability of secured 
credit will be reduced, or even lost, if there is uncertainty regarding the 
enforceability of this security, in particular whether the assets that it covers can be 
used to pay other debts, such as the wages of employees.  The concessions made 
to secured creditors in relation to the order of payment in liquidation indicate a 
fresh willingness to recognise and uphold their entitlements. 
 
Most recently the position of the state owned banks looks to be significantly 
strengthened through overseas listings, and the injection of capital as a result is 
timely.  Not only will the new bankruptcy law potentially bring the scale of the 
problem of bad debts to light but also the banks will be exposed to foreign 
competition as the banking market opened up from December 11 2006, under 
WTO obligations, albeit subject to restrictions.138  The banks will be exposed to 
the risk of their clientele transferring their deposits to fresh competitors and such a 
move would weaken the deposit base that has shielded the banks from collapse in 
the face of bad debts.139 
 
4. Development of corporate governance structures140   
Effective corporate governance is essential as a means of prevention of financial 
difficulties in companies.  It minimises the potential for financial difficulties to be 
caused by agency costs generated by the separation of ownership and control, such 
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as slack management, or corruption.  High profile examples from western countries 
indicate that poor corporate governance controls lie at the heart of many significant 
insolvencies.141  There have been significant failings in this area in China, however 
more recently the corporation law was revised and successfully passed in the 
deliberation of the Standing Committee of the NPC in 2005.  This revised law has 
been in force since 1st January 2006.  It improves the corporate governance 
structure, strengthens duties and personal liabilities of directors and managers, and 
particularly emphasizes the protection of small shareholders.  It appears to be a 
much more suitable and practicable law than the law it replaced, which was 
outdated.142  Anecdotal reports suggest that it is effective and that the safeguards 
against misconduct are consequently strengthened.  The effective operation of the 
corporate rescue procedures will also depend on existing notorious inadequacies in 
relation to accounting information being resolved.  China has made significant 
strides in this regard, at least on paper.143 
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 5. Continued state intervention 
The potential for continued state involvement in the new corporate rescue 
procedures has been noted above.  SOEs have gained benefits in the form, for 
example, of finance from state banks and monopoly protection.  However 
involvement in state aids may infringe China’s obligations under GATT, Article XVII 
and in acceding to the WTO China agreed that SOEs would make purchases and 
sales on a purely commercial basis and that those enterprises from other WTO 
member states would have a fair chance to compete.  Paradoxically this 
development could be strongly to the long term benefit of the Chinese economy.  
Competition law not only rewards the fittest competitors and forces weaker 
competitors to reform or leave the market but it also acts as an important 
governance mechanism that minimises agency costs.  A lack of a rigorous approach 
to state aids for firms in difficulty or whole industrial sectors in difficulty may address 
a short term need but it can be damaging to the economy in the long term.  State 
intervention can cushion a struggling firm from the effects of the market, leading to 
inefficiencies.  Firms which are not viable can continue, when they would otherwise 
be subject to insolvency proceedings.  Where the state has bailed out a company in 
the past, or has otherwise intervened to save it from financial difficulties, this may 
lead to an expectation of similar salvage in future. 144  In addition, where state 
assistance takes the form of economic aid there is a drain on the public purse.  In 
the long term it would be advisable for China to heed the jurisprudence of the 
European Union that such aid should be temporary, limited to what is necessary in 
order to facilitate reorganization, and should be a one off event, so that companies 
do not have the expectation that they will be bailed out again should their problems 
recur.145   
 
G. CONCLUSION 
The key social role that SOEs have played, and the potentially devastating effects on 
the workforce in particular regions that might be felt if the availability of corporate 
rescue, and particularly liquidation, proceedings were opened up, hitherto delayed 
the revision of the insolvency laws.  These problems remain and social impact of 
the new law is potentially great on paper, presenting the prospect of large scale 
redundancies, both through liquidations and through restructuring in the context of 
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corporate rescue procedures.  Such redundancies would strain the presently 
inadequate social safety net, leading to a prospect of social unrest which was 
previously kept at bay through manipulation by the state.  Although the problems 
are not as potentially great as they once were, owing to the implementation of 
gradual reforms in key areas over a number of years, it is clear that they remain a 
threat.  The timescale for the implementation of the new law does not allow much 
opportunity for further developments in these areas.  Potentially therefore the new 
law could have devastating social consequences.  However the prospects of the 
new law reaching its full impact soon after its introduction are likely to be 
significantly limited by the court system, which may be subject to government 
influence; the inexperience of the court system in this area; the lack of accurate 
accounting information; and also a lack of cultural awareness of corporate rescue 
procedures. 146   In addition a significant skills gap is likely to be present for some 
time, since the operation of a system of corporate insolvency laws requires the 
involvement of trained and experienced accountants, insolvency professionals, asset 
valuers and judges with an understanding of the complexities of rescue 
proceedings.147  Moreover there are many points of detail that are not addressed 
under the legislation and that will need to be fleshed out through judicial guidance 
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147  X Lan, supra n 28.   
and by professional experience.  Further revisions of the law may be necessitated as 
a result. 
